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Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to
mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit
in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it
arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is
associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime
loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances
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Introduction

The U.S. mortgage market of recent years shows a high rate of both originations and
foreclosures, especially in the riskier subprime sector. This trend, which has emerged
as a major economic event, has provoked significant discussion of how it occurred
and how regulation might prevent its reoccurrence. A particular concern, voiced for
example in a 2004 report of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), is
that many mortgages are “predatory,” which the GAO defines as transactions that
“contain terms and conditions that ultimately harm borrowers” (GAO [20], p.3).
We consider how such predation can arise, its consequences, and the likely effects of
regulatory intervention.
Any loan can cause harm in an ex post sense. However, it is much harder to explain why borrowers enter loans that harm them in an ex ante sense, as the term
“predatory” implies. The explanations proposed to date focus primarily on fraud
and confusion. The GAO report, for example, cites “forgery and false statements”
on the part of lenders, and “mental infirmities” and “diminished cognitive capacity”
on the part of borrowers. In fact, much of the discussion of the recent foreclosure
surge contemplates whether borrowers actually understand the terms of their loans
(see, e.g., Bar-Gill [4] and the references therein). The law implicitly shares this
view. The federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) and state
predatory-lending laws purport to identify predation by features observable to the
borrower at origination (e.g., a balloon payment on a high-interest loan). The existing literature on predatory mortgages, which is largely in law journals, also generally
shares this view.1,2 A drawback to this approach, however, is that many of the practices associated with predatory lending are “subtle, involving the misuse of practices
that most of time can improve credit market efficiency”(Gramlich [22]).
Fraud and confusion appear sufficient cause for borrowers to enter loans causing
expected harm. But before resorting to such pathologies, a natural starting point for
1

See, e.g., Engel and McCoy [14], [15], Renuart [35], Silverman [37].
Related, a common way to measure the extent of predatory lending is to report the percentage
of loans that make use of a suspect practice. For example, Stock [39] studies foreclosed subprime
mortgages and finds that 14% use balloon payments and 59% have prepayment penalties and, further, that these features are even more prevalent among the higher interest rate mortgages. Stock
concludes that there is “strong evidence that predatory practices are occurring in the [sample] subprime market.” Similarly, ACORN Fair Housing’s survey [1] of subprime borrowers finds that nearly
half report “problems paying their loans.” Because less than 10% of these borrowers report a change
in employment or wages, the study interprets this finding as “suggesting that a significant number
of these loans were unaffordable from the outset.”
2
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economic analysis is with agents who understand their economic environment. This
might at first seem incompatible with predation, in that borrowers do not knowingly
accept expected harm, but the information structure of the subprime market suggests
otherwise. The information structure arises from the high concentration of the
subprime market, in which over half of originations in 2006 were by lenders with at
least a 5% market share, which translates to over 250,000 subprime mortgages. Such
extensive experience with other borrowers’ outcomes can impart an informational
advantage over a borrower regarding her own likely outcome. Furthermore, this
advantage is likely to grow with the loan’s tenure, as the lender compiles a time series
unobservable to others.
We model a homeowner partway through a mortgage who has risky income and
a new spending opportunity. If income is currently high, then she can use cashout refinancing to pursue the opportunity; if it is low, then she can use distressed
refinancing to attempt to keep the house. However, both these refinancings end in
foreclosure if future income is low, and the current lender has private information
about future income. This scenario offers the possibility of predatory lending: the
lender offers refinancing he knows will harm the borrower through foreclosure. The
key questions are whether predatory lending actually occurs in equilibrium, and how
competition affects its incidence.
We find predatory lending in two forms. In one form, the lender refinances a homeowner facing foreclosure into a new mortgage that will also end in foreclosure, to
extract more cash. We find that distressed borrowers are always vulnerable to this
form of predation when their lenders are monopolists, but when we introduce competing lenders we find that the predation generally reduces or vanishes. However, if
borrowers are sufficiently behind on their mortgages, competition is no help.
In the other form of predation, the lender provides cash-out refinancing that ends
in foreclosure to a homeowner who is successfully paying down the mortgage. We
find that homeowners with sufficient equity are vulnerable to this type of predation,
and spending the cash on home improvement only makes matters worse. Again,
competition among lenders generally reduces or eliminates the problem.
Recent concerns about predatory lending have led to direct policy responses, such as
the introduction of anti-predatory lending laws at state and federal levels. Moreover,
a number of other current policy debates overlap with the issue: prominent examples
are concerns about securitization; the protection granted to defaulted borrowers; and
ongoing efforts to reduce foreclosure. We use our framework to analyze these issues.

2

The existing literature commonly attributes predatory lending to lender fraud and
borrower misunderstanding. Morgan [30] offers arguably the most fully articulated
version of this view, and presents a model of payday lending in which a lender can, at
cost, persuade borrowers to overestimate their future incomes.3 Related, a number
of papers model borrowers who poorly anticipate their own future actions (see, e.g.,
Ausubel [2]; Gabaix and Laibson [19]; and Della Vigna and Malmendier [11]).
Confusion, fraud and other criminality doubtless contribute to the incidence of predation. What our analysis demonstrates is that a realistic information asymmetry
between borrowers and lenders is enough to generate predation and can explain (at
least qualitatively) when and where it occurs. In this sense, predatory lending may
be a more pervasive phenomenon than commonly believed. Moreover, our analysis
places an upper bound on the efficacy of consumer education and anti-fraud legislation at combating predatory practices, and it allows us to evaluate alternate policy
responses in a standard way.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes when predatory lending occurs. Section 4 discusses empirical
predictions. Section 5 studies the effects of competition. Section 6 considers a variety
of regulatory interventions. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.

2

The model

We model the interactions between a single borrower and one or more lenders. To
ease exposition we use female and male pronouns for the borrower and the lenders
respectively. There are three dates: 0, 1, and 2. At date 0, the borrower borrows
an amount L0 from one of the lenders (henceforth, the incumbent) to purchase a
house. The loan contract is a standard fixed-rate mortgage with multiple repayment
dates and specifies a gross interest rate, R ≥ 1. We consider a two-period mortgage,
2L
0
so that the borrower’s scheduled repayment on each of dates 1 and 2 is P ≡ R1+R
,
P
P
i.e., R + R2 = L0 . We initially consider a mortgage contract with no prepayment
penalty, meaning that if the borrower pays P ′ > P at date 1, her scheduled date 2
payment is reduced to R (RL0 − P ′ ) < P . None of our results depend on the details
of how the loan size L0 or interest rate R is determined, so we take these two values
as exogenously given.
3

See also Richardson [36], who develops a model in which borrowers know that some lenders will
deceive them. However, by assumption any borrower who deals with a predatory lender is made
worse off, and Richardson’s model is too reduced form to explain why this happens.
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At each of dates 1 and 2 the borrower receives a publicly observable income, yt ∈
{K, I}, where K < I. If a borrower’s date 1 income y1 falls short of her scheduled
mortgage payment P , we say she is distressed. For borrowers with a given set of
observable characteristics, the average probability of high income (yt = I) at both
dates 1 and 2 is p. The value of the borrower’s house is H0 at date 0, and, at date
1, changes permanently to H, a draw from a distribution with lower bound Hd .4
The borrower is risk-neutral over non-negative consumption, with a gross discount
rate of 1 between periods. The borrower enters date 1 without any assets other than
her house. She is able to save at a gross interest rate of 1. If she still owns the house
after date 2, she receives an additional surplus of H + X, where H is the market
value of the house at date 2 and X > 0 represents her additional private benefits
from the house, along with the potentially large transactions costs associated with
selling the house.5 Finally, at date 1 the borrower may spend M (henceforth, the
expenditure) to generate a non-pecuniary benefit of M + S > M at date 2. Typical
examples include payments for tuition, weddings, medical procedures, or just general
consumption.
Like the borrower, the incumbent and any other potential lenders are risk neutral. All
lenders have a gross opportunity cost of funds of 1. Whenever the borrower fails to
make a scheduled payment, her lender can foreclose on the house, and if the proceeds
fall short of the debt, he can also seize any savings to cover the difference. Thus, the
lender keeps min {H + A, Z}, where A is the borrower’s savings and Z is the amount
the lender is owed. The borrower is left with the remaining H + A − min {H + A, Z}.
We assume that the lender is unable to garnish (i.e., seize) any of the borrower’s
income. This assumption captures the costs and legal restrictions associated with
wage garnishment (see White [42]). Nonetheless, in Section 6 we consider the opposite
case in which garnishment is costless and unrestricted.
We focus on lending decisions at date 1, when the incumbent — as well as potential
new lenders — can offer refinancing. Such refinancing might be just a restructuring
of the original loan, or it could include extra lending to allow the borrower to undertake the expenditure. The refinancing terms are summarized by P1 and P2 , the
net payments from the borrower to lender at dates 1 and 2. The interest rate after
2
refinancing is RLP0 −P
. The borrower is free to reject all offers.
1
4

The assumption that the house value H is constant after period 1 is inessential. For instance,
if, instead, H followed a random walk process agents would have to take an additional expectation
when calculating their expected utilities, but our results would be qualitatively unaffected.
5
Allowing for a benefit at each date prior to date 2 would not qualitatively change our results,
provided it is not too large.
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All quantities discussed thus far are publicly observable. The model’s key assumption
is that the incumbent privately acquires additional information about the borrower’s
date 2 income prospects before date 1 payments and/or refinancing. In contrast, both
the borrower herself and any other lenders still know only that the average probability
of high income at each date is p.6 This assumption is intended to capture the ability
of typical consumer creditors, who deal with thousands or even millions of borrowers,
to use the information delivered by these relationships to forecast the repayment
prospects of an individual borrower (e.g., through an internally generated propensity
score). The borrower herself lacks this knowledge. We note that this advantage does
not turn on whether the borrower knows and understands her FICO score, or other
such third-party credit score, because these scores summarize only part of her debt
history and do not take into account any of her assets, income, or other relevant
circumstances (see, e.g., Chatterjee et al. [9]). Furthermore, these scores represent
only the information of the current credit report, whereas an existing lender has access
to a time series of credit reports, which is economically valuable (Musto [32]). Because
lenders to corporations are less likely to enjoy these informational advantages, our
model is a better fit to the consumer than to the corporate credit market.
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which the informational advantage of the incumbent is as large as possible: the incumbent perfectly foresees the borrower’s date
2 income y2 , and y1 and y2 are uncorrelated, so that the date 1 income realization
reveals nothing about date 2 income prospects. These assumptions have no qualitative effect on our results, as we discuss in Section 5. Throughout the paper we refer
to the borrower as having good prospects if the incumbent knows privately that the
borrower’s date 2 income will be I, and as having bad prospects otherwise. Looking
ahead to the analysis, the incumbent’s informational advantage over the borrower is
key because it creates the possibility that the incumbent makes a loan on date 1 that
he knows is detrimental to the borrower. Indeed, welfare-reducing lending to rational
borrowers would appear impossible without an informational advantage of this type.
For our model to generate nontrivial forms of refinancing, we must ensure that at date
1, borrowers are sometimes in financial distress and sometimes interested in tapping
into their home equity to increase their consumption. Thus, we make the following
assumptions about relative parameter values:
6

This assumption that the provider of funds has an informational advantage over the recipient
about the recipient’s prospects has precedents in analyses of other financial situations. Benveniste
and Spindt [5] is an early example; more recent examples include Manove et al. [27], Garmaise [21],
Bernhardt and Krasa [6], Inderst and Mueller [25], and Villeneuve [41].
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Income y1 ,
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Expenditure
decision

Income
y2

Date 1

Borrower
payment

Date 2

Figure 1: Timeline
Assumption 1 The low income realization K is sufficiently low:
1
K < min {RL0 , Hd } .
2
By Assumption 1, the borrower’s worst-case income realization (two draws of low
income K) is not sufficient either to pay off the initial mortgage L0 or to buy the
house from the lender, even if the house’s market value falls. Moreover, because
R ≥ 1, it follows that K < P , so low income at date 1 puts the borrower in distress.
Finally, K may or may not be high enough to cover the expenditure cost M; for use
below, let SK = S if K ≥ M, and SK ≡ 0 otherwise.
Assumption 2 The high income realization I is neither too low nor too high:




R2 L0
K R2 L0 + M
max RL0 − ,
< I < min RL0 ,
+ M, RL0 + M − K .
R
1+R
1+R
By the lower bound of Assumption 2, the high income realization I is sufficiently high
that an income stream of I and then K is enough to pay off the initial mortgage,
and that an income stream of I and then I is enough to cover both the expenditure
and repayment of the original mortgage. It follows that I > P , and I + K > RL0 .
By the upper bound, I is not high enough to allow the borrower to repay her entire
loan at date 1, or to allow her to make both her scheduled mortgage payment and
the expenditure, and an income stream of I and then K is not enough to cover both
the expenditure and the repayment of the mortgage.
6

Assumption 3 The borrower’s private benefits X are high enough that the borrower
never strategically defaults; exceed K + I − min {H, RL0 } ; and are high in relation to
the expenditure surplus, X/S ≥ p.
If the house value falls below the present value of outstanding loan payments, the
borrower may be tempted to default on a loan payment that she has enough income
to cover, i.e. strategically default. Because the possibility of strategic default is
tangential to our analysis, we assume that the borrower’s valuation of the house,
H + X, is always high enough that she repays when she can. The second part of the
assumption simplifies the analysis (but is not essential; see footnote 10) by ensuring
that a borrower with low and then high income is prepared to pledge her entire income
to the lender to save her house, rather than accept immediate foreclosure. By the
third part of the assumption the surplus from home ownership is high enough relative
to the surplus from the expenditure that the borrower would not give up a probability
p of keeping her house to make the expenditure.

3

Analysis

To identify the economic conditions associated with predatory consumer mortgage
lending, we characterize the model’s (perfect Bayesian) equilibria. We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria, which always exist in our model. First, we give a
precise definition of predatory lending.
Definition: A predatory loan is one that the borrower would decline if she possessed
the lender’s information.
In principle, under this definition predatory lending could afflict borrowers with either
good or bad prospects. For example, borrowers with good prospects could fall victim
if they underestimate their expected repayments by a sufficient amount. However,
Proposition 1 establishes that this does not occur. This implication is consistent with
public concern about predatory lending, which generally focuses on consumers who
experience negative shocks to wealth. The result follows principally from the lender’s
inability to garnish income.
Proposition 1 A borrower with good prospects is never the victim of predatory lending.
7

Because predatory lending can occur both when the borrower’s date 1 income is low
(K), and when it is high (I), we consider these two cases in turn. In this sense, it
is the borrower’s income prospects rather than her current income that determine
her susceptibility to predation. We first assume the incumbent is the only possible
lender at date 1; we gauge competition’s effect on predatory lending by introducing
competing lenders in Section 5.

Low income at date 1
In this case, the borrower cannot meet her scheduled mortgage payment (Assumption 1) and might be interested in refinancing. If the lender knows the borrower’s
prospects are bad, then he knows foreclosure is inevitable. However, he might choose
to withhold this information from the borrower and refinance the mortgage anyway.
Without refinancing, his recovery is bounded by the liquidation value of the house. If
he refinances, he can extract some payment at date 1 and still liquidate, if underpaid,
at date 2. Thus, there exist refinancing terms he is prepared to offer even when he
knows the borrower’s prospects are bad. However, if the borrower knew her prospects
were bad, she should default at date 1 and keep her income rather than pay it toward
unattainable ownership. Therefore, the lender has a strong incentive to keep private
the borrower’s prospects and offer refinancing. Although such forbearance at first
seems charitable it can be predatory if it reduces the borrower’s well-being. For this
reason, the practice is sometimes referred to as “phantom help.”7
Proposition 2 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is low (y1 = K). Then an
equilibrium exists in which the incumbent offers to refinance the loan by reducing the
date 1 payment to P1 ≤ K, the borrower accepts, and the loan is predatory. In the
predatory equilibrium most profitable to the lender, refinancing reduces the welfare
of a borrower with bad prospects by SK + K for low house values, H ≤ I, and by
SK + K + I −min {H, RL0 } for high house values, H ≥ I. Relative to no refinancing,
the lender’s profits are increased by K + p(I − H) and I + K − min {H, RL0 } for low
and high house values, respectively.
The form of predatory lending identified in Proposition 2 reduces the welfare of a
borrower with bad prospects in two ways. First, if M ≤ K, the borrower foregoes
the expenditure but still loses her house, a welfare loss of SK relative to accepting
7

See, for example, various press releases from the Illinois Attorney General’s office, and consumer
advice from organizations such as the AARP and the FTC.
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immediate foreclosure. Second, the borrower transfers some of her resources to the
lender. When house values are high (H > RL0 ), equity-stripping8 may contribute
toward this transfer. Moreover, any fraction of date 1 income that the borrower pays
is money that she could have instead consumed and, by analogy, is income-stripping.9
The proposition characterizes the maximum size of the transfer, which is determined
by two constraints.10 First, the increase is limited by the borrower’s actual date 1
income K. Second, the borrower must think she has some chance of repaying the
refinancing loan, and, therefore the total payments to which she agrees must be less
than I + K. The actual transfer from a borrower with bad prospects is determined
by which of these constraints binds first.
Merton [29] observes that a loan can be decomposed into risk-free debt and a put
option, which represents the borrower’s right to default. In our model, the lender’s
inability to garnish income means that the borrower’s default option allows her to
sell her income for a price equal to that income plus the monetary gain of default.
Therefore, exercise is always optimal for a borrower with bad prospects, but, for a
borrower with good prospects, exercise entails the additional cost of surrendering
private house benefits X. Predation is possible because a borrower unaware that
she has bad prospects overestimates the cost of exercise, and hence undervalues the
default option. Consequently, such a borrower surrenders her option at terms that
are too favorable to the lender.
In addition to predatory equilibria, non-predatory equilibria also exist. However, unless house values are low, the incumbent does not profit in non-predatory equilibria.
The reason is that when house values are high, any offer that is profitable to make to
good prospects is also profitable to make to bad prospects. Thus, to the extent that
an equilibrium with strictly positive lender profits is more likely than one with zero
profits, predatory lending is more likely to occur when house values are high. More
generally, the equilibrium most profitable to the lender is predatory:
Proposition 3 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is low (y1 = K). Then the
lender’s profits are strictly greater in the most profitable predatory equilibrium than in
8
“Equity stripping occurs when a loan is made based on the equity in a property rather than on
a borrower’s ability to repay the loan,” FTC [18].
9
We thank Don Morgan for suggesting this terminology.
10
In general, the refinancing terms also have to satisfy a third constraint, namely, that the increase
in the borrower’s expected payment to the lender is less than the gain to keeping her house. The
second part of Assumption 3 ensures that this third constraint never binds. An earlier draft of this
paper allows for lower values of X. The lender’s maximal profits and the bad-prospects borrower’s
worst welfare loss are both (weakly) reduced, but otherwise our results are unaffected.
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any non-predatory equilibrium. In particular, if H ≥ I, the lender’s non-predatory
profits are zero.

High income at date 1
If a borrower has high income at date 1, she is able to make her scheduled mortgage
payment (by Assumption 2). However, she might still be interested in refinancing
her loan so that she can also benefit from the expenditure. When a borrower with
bad prospects refinances in this way she subsequently defaults when she learns that
her date 2 income is low (again by Assumption 2). Although refinancing makes the
expenditure possible, it reduces the borrower’s welfare when it leads to the loss of her
home.
For a borrower with bad prospects to accept this refinancing, two conditions must
be met. First, because at date 1 the borrower realizes that her date 2 income might
be low, she needs to derive enough surplus from the expenditure to justify losing her
house with probability 1 − p, i.e., S ≥ (1 − p) X. Second, the lender needs to receive
at least what he would have if the borrower had not refinanced. In that case, the
lender receives I at date 1 (because R ≥ 1, the borrower prepays as much as possible)
and the remaining loan balance R (RL0 − I) at date 2. The most the lender can
obtain from a refinanced borrower at date 1 is I − M (otherwise, the borrower cannot
afford the expenditure), and the most he can recover from a defaulting borrower at
date 2 is the house value H. Therefore, the second condition is that I − M + H
exceeds I + R (RL0 − I) or, equivalently, that H exceeds P̄2 ≡ R (RL0 − I) + M.
Economically, P̄2 is the date 2 payment the lender requires for refinancing to be
worthwhile. Proposition 4 establishes that these two conditions are both necessary
and sufficient for equilibrium predation of a borrower with high date 1 income:
Proposition 4 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is high (y1 = I). An equilibrium exists with predatory lending if and only if H ≥ P̄2 and S − (1 − p) X ≥
0. In such an equilibrium, the incumbent offers new loan terms that enable the
borrower to afford the expenditure, and the borrower accepts. In the most profitable predatory lending equilibrium, the borrower with bad prospects suffers a net
loss min{S − (1 − p) X, H − P̄2 , I −P̄2 } + X − S. Relative to no refinancing, the
lender’s profits are increased by min I − P̄2 , pI + (1 − p) H − P̄2 , S − (1 − p) X .
In the predatory equilibria identified by Proposition 4, a borrower with substantial
equity in her house and affordable current payments refinances into eventually un10

affordable payments. As in the low-income case, predation entails a transfer from
the borrower to the lender, achieved via a mixture of income- and equity-stripping.
The lender finances new spending even when he knows that doing so will result in
the borrower losing the house she would otherwise have kept, causing a social loss.
Among the terms applied to such lending are “lending without regard to ability to
pay” and “asset-based lending.” From the option perspective, such lending resurrects the borrower’s option to default, which was otherwise sure to expire unused.
However, exercising the default option at date 2 is very costly for the borrower, as
it entails the loss of her house. Consequently, the resurrected default option has
negative value for a borrower with bad prospects, which is the source of predation.
An important implication of Proposition 4 is that this predatory cash-out refinancing
can occur only when house values (H) are high. Moreover, as in the low-income
case, it is impossible for the lender to make equilibrium non-predatory profits when
house values are high. The reason is the same as before: any loan terms that are
profitable to extend to borrowers with good prospects can also profitably be offered
to bad prospects. More generally, the following analogue to Proposition 3 holds:
Proposition 5 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is high (y1 = I) and the conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied with strict inequality. Then the lender’s profits are
strictly greater in the most profitable predatory equilibrium than in any non-predatory
equilibrium whenever the house value H is high enough. In particular, if H ≥ I, the
lender’s non-predatory profits are zero.11
When house values are not high enough for predatory lending to occur, the equilibrium
outcome is socially desirable (see Appendix B on non-predatory equilibria). The
lender finances the expenditure if and only if the borrower can ultimately afford it,
and foreclosure never occurs.

4

Empirical predictions

Propositions 2 and 4 characterize both the incidence of predatory lending (i.e., when
it occurs) and its severity (i.e., the maximal welfare loss of its victims). Table
1 summarizes the comparative statics for both aspects of predatory lending with
11

The highest
predatory profit strictly exceeds the highest non-predatory profit if S − (1 − p) X >

p I − P̄2 , or if H ≥ I.

11

H
p
X
S
K
I
M
R

house value
probability of high income
private benefits from house
surplus from expenditure
low income
high income
expenditure cost
interest rate on initial mortgage

Severity,
low income
−
no effect
no effect
+
+
+
−
−

Severity,
high income
+
+
+
−
no effect
+
−
−

Incidence,
high income
+
+/−
−
+
no effect
+
−
−

Table 1: Comparative statics for the incidence and severity of predatory lending
respect to the main parameters of our model. Note that because predatory lending
is always possible in the low-income case, there is no column for how the parameters
affect the incidence of low-income predation. Moreover, the parameters p and X have
no effect on the severity of low-income predation only because of Assumption 3: see
footnote 10.
The surplus a borrower derives from her house, X, affects the severity and incidence
of the predation of high-income borrowers differently. On the one hand, when X is
higher a borrower suffers more under foreclosure. On the other hand, higher values
of X make the borrower more careful about refinancing into a higher repayment loan
and, thus, reduce the incidence of predation.
The urgency of the expenditure M is reflected by S. Greater urgency (e.g., medical
expenses vs. vacation) both increases the severity of low-income predation, and the
incidence of high-income predation. In the former case, predation diverts the borrower away from the expenditure into a failed effort to avert foreclosure. In the latter
case, more urgent expenditures make the borrower more willing to risk foreclosure.
However, the severity of high-income predation is decreasing in the urgency of the expenditure: even though the borrower loses her house, the greater importance at least
partially offsets the welfare loss. Indeed, expenditures deemed vital or essential can
be more important to the borrower than keeping her house. In this case, Assumption
3 is violated because the borrower strategically defaults on her house to undertake
the urgent expenditure.
The parameter p determines the variance of the borrower’s income, with higher values
associated with lower variance.12 In general, the number of borrowers preyed upon is
12

2

The borrower’s income variance is p (1 − p) (I − K) and is decreasing in p, provided p ≥ 1/2.
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non-monotonic in p and, hence, in income variance because predation of high-income
borrowers is possible only when p exceeds some threshold. However, for values of
p above this threshold, the number of predatory victims declines as income variance
declines. Moreover, both the number of predatory victims and their total welfare
loss (i.e., the number of victims times their average welfare loss) converge to zero as
income uncertainty vanishes (i.e., p → 1). The associated empirical prediction is
that more borrowers fall victim to predatory lending in regions facing more economic
uncertainty, and in times when the future of the economy is less clear. Another
prediction is that few borrowers are preyed upon in prime (i.e., high p) markets.
The effect of loan-to-value that we find is somewhat at odds with conventional wisdom. Specifically, some researchers argue that a high ratio is evidence that a loan is
predatory (see, e.g., Quercia et al. [34]), whereas we argue that it discourages predatory refinancing of the loan. In general, predation is increasing in collateral values
(H).13 Predatory lending is also associated with smaller loans: the size of the new
loan granted the borrower is P −K and P + M −I when the borrower’s date 1 income
is low and high, respectively. Hence the loan size increases in M and decreases in K,
I, and both the severity and incidence of predation decrease in loan size.
Our model matches several key stylized facts relating to the effects of a run-up in
house prices. Consider the equilibrium outcomes in two parameterizations of our
model, one with low house prices, and the other with high house prices. First, high
house prices increase both refinancing activity in general and predatory lending in
particular. Second, high house prices reduce foreclosure at date 1, because lowincome borrowers are more likely to be able to restructure their loans, even if some of
this restructuring activity is predatory. Third, high house prices increase foreclosure
at date 2. For borrowers who were in distress at date 1, this increase in foreclosure
simply represents the postponement of foreclosure from date 1 to date 2. However, for
borrowers who were not distressed, the increase in foreclosure stems from an increase
in predatory cash-out refinancings.
Although some appreciation in the value of a house reflects general market trends,
some may also stem from home improvement undertaken by the borrower. We consider whether refinancing for home improvement is particularly susceptible to predation by recasting the date 1 expenditure M as one that increases the market value of
the house to H + M. As before, the borrower’s gain S from the expenditure is immediate, although our analysis would change little if the gain were instead contingent
13

However, the intensity of low-income predation declines in H, because the lender obtains
min {H, RL0 } from immediate foreclosure, and the higher house values reduce the additional amount
he can obtain from predatory refinancing.

13

on keeping the house at date 2.
Economically, the key difference between home improvement refinancing and the consumption refinancing analyzed thus far is that the money spent on home improvement
can be recovered by the lender if the borrower defaults. Given that high home values
engender predatory lending, it follows that home improvement loans are more likely
than other forms of lending to involve predation. In particular, the minimum house
value that makes a borrower vulnerable is lower when the loan itself increases the
collateral value.
Proposition 6 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is I. If the expenditure is home
improvement, then there exists a predatory equilibrium if and only if H ≥ P̄2 − M
and S ≥ (1 − p) X.

5

Competition and robustness

We now turn to the effects of competition. To borrowers with monopolist lenders, refinancing brings two potential benefits: for low-income borrowers, keeping the house,
and for high-income borrowers, extra consumption. Competition at the refinancing
stage adds a third potential benefit: the possibility of a reduction in the interest rate.
We analyze the effect of competition by introducing additional potential lenders.
There are, in addition to the incumbent, at least two14 more lenders who can make
refinancing offers to the borrower. Like the incumbent, they have limitless cash to
lend, are risk neutral, and require an expected gross return of 1. Unlike the incumbent, however, they lack an informational advantage over the borrower and know only
that the borrower’s date 2 income is high with probability p. The borrower knows the
entrants have no private information, and the borrower can see which offer is from
14

Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. [17] study an auction in which a single informed bidder competes
against one or more uninformed bidder(s). They show that the informed bidder’s payoff is independent of the number of uninformed bidders, and that each uninformed bidder makes zero expected
profits. This result does not apply in our environment, however, because the borrower may decline
an apparently attractive offer from the incumbent (the informed lender) if she believes the incumbent
knows she has bad prospects. (In contrast, in a standard auction the seller’s beliefs about a buyer’s
information are irrelevant.) Consequently, at least two uninformed lenders are required in our setting for competition to have its full effect. In particular, with only one uninformed lender equilibria
exist in which an uninformed lender makes an above-cost offer, and the informed incumbent cannot
undercut it because of borrower beliefs.
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whom.15
The mechanics of competition are that all offers are simultaneous, and lenders are
bound to honor terms if their offers are accepted. The borrower chooses which, if
any, offer to accept. We assume that she chooses the incumbent’s offer when she
is otherwise indifferent. If the borrower is indifferent among multiple offers from
entrants and strictly prefers them to the incumbent’s offer, she randomizes between
the entrant offers.

Low income at date 1
The effect of competition depends critically on the level of house prices. First,
consider the case in which house values are high enough that the incumbent can fully
recover the amount owed via foreclosure, i.e. H ≥ RL0 . In this case, uninformed
entrants are prepared to lend the borrower the amount she needs to pay off her loan,
RL0 −K, in exchange for a promise to pay RL0 −K at date 2. (The high house value
ensures that the entrant is able to recover RL0 − K even if the borrower defaults.)
Given the outside option provided by the entrant, the incumbent cannot get the
borrower to pay him more than a total of RL0 over dates 1 and 2. Consequently,
the borrower pays the incumbent RL0 if she defaults at date 1 and is foreclosed, and
pays a total of RL0 across dates 1 and 2 if she refinances. In this case, competition
eliminates both predatory lending and the incumbent’s refinancing profits.
Second, consider the opposite extreme, in which the house value H is low, in partic−K−pI
ular, below RL01−p
. In this case, a lender cannot recover the date 1 loan balance
RL0 from the borrower in expected terms.16 Consequently, uninformed entrants are
unwilling to refinance the borrower. The incumbent, however, is willing to refinance
because by doing so he increases his recovery beyond that he obtains from immediate foreclosure, namely H. Hence, the incumbent enjoys a monopoly position even
though potential entrants exist.
Analysis of intermediate house values produces similar results:
Proposition 7 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is low (y1 = K). (A) If
1
H < 1−p
(RL0 − K − pI), the set of predatory equilibria is the same as for the
15

For related work on competition among asymmetrically informed lenders, see Dell’Ariccia et al.
[10], Hauswald and Marquez [23], and von Thadden [40].
16
Total recovery is bounded above by total income, K + I, for borrowers with good prospects and
by income plus house value, K + H, for borrowers with bad prospects.
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monopoly case. (B) Otherwise, the worst equilibrium welfare loss for a borrower
with bad prospects is SK + max {0, min {K, RL0 − H}}. Relative to no refinancing,
the incumbent’s profits are increased by, at most, max {0, RL0 − H}. (C) The severity
of predatory lending is strictly reduced by competition if and only if H > RL0 − K.
Recall from our discussion following Proposition 2 that refinancing can be understood
as a borrower redeeming her current position (short a risk-free bond and long a default
put option) by issuing a new security. Predation occurs when a borrower with
bad prospects agrees to issue a security that is more valuable than the position she
redeems. When the borrower is in a position to issue a security with a market value
above RL0 , lenders compete with each to offer her the most favorable redemption
terms. In contrast, when house values are low, any security issued by the borrower
has a low market value, and entrants will not pay RL0 for it. The incumbent lender
still refinances because he is the short counterparty on the default put option. The
failure of competition to help the borrower when house values are low is similar to the
debt overhang problem identified in the corporate context (Myers [33]). We return
to this point when we discuss securitization in Section 6.

High income at Date 1
A borrower with high date 1 income and bad prospects is vulnerable to predation
by a monopolist incumbent only when house values are high enough to fully secure
the refinancing loan. Her welfare loss can be decomposed into two terms: X − S,
representing the loss of her home offset by the gain of the expenditure, and a term
corresponding to the increase in payments she agrees to make to the incumbent (see
Proposition 4). Competition from entrants overturns the latter of these welfare losses.
Absent refinancing, she pays a total of R (RL0 − I) + I. Competitive refinancing
reduces her total payments to RL0 , a saving of (R − 1) (RL0 − I). However, if the
former welfare loss, X − S, exceeds this reduction in payments, the borrower is still
worse off, and predatory lending occurs under competitive conditions, although it is
less severe than when the incumbent is a monopolist.
Proposition 8 Suppose the borrower’s date 1 income is high (y1 = I). Predatory lending occurs if and only if H ≥ RL0 − I + M, S − (1 − p) X ≥ 0, and
(R − 1) (RL0 − I) < X − S. Under these conditions, the worst equilibrium welfare
loss for a borrower with bad prospects is X − S − (R − 1) (RL0 − I), and in any
equilibrium the incumbent recovers exactly the outstanding loan balance, RL0 . When16

ever predatory lending is possible under monopolistic conditions, competition either
eliminates it or reduces its severity.
In spite of the generally positive conclusion of Proposition 8, competition also has a
(perhaps surprising) drawback, namely, that under some circumstances it engenders
predatory lending. Specifically, this case arises when house values are high enough
for predation under competition but too low for predation under monopoly; i.e. H lies
between RL0 − I + M and R (RL0 − I) + M, and additionally S − (1 − p) X ≥ 0 and
(R − 1) (RL0 − I) < X −S. Under these conditions, without competition the incumbent would stick with the status quo, and no foreclosure would occur. Competition
affects the incumbent’s decision by reducing his payoff under the status quo, because
the borrower can now obtain zero-interest refinancing. Under these conditions the
incumbent offers predatory cash-out refinancing that leads to foreclosure.

Robustness
We consider several alternative versions of our model to test the robustness of our
results. First, in an online supplement we examine a version of our model in which
the lender’s informational advantage is less pronounced so that he can forecast the
borrower’s date 2 income only imperfectly.The main results remain qualitatively unchanged. From the lender’s perspective, replacing perfect foresight with imperfect
foresight means that a borrower with “bad prospects” has at least some chance of
being able to repay a loan. In turn, the borrower’s expected welfare loss from refinancing and, therefore, the severity of predation, is reduced. However, the effect on
the incidence of predation is ambiguous. Although refinancing terms that were previously predatory are no longer so, a lender now finds a borrower with bad prospects
more attractive, and thus new predatory opportunities can arise.
A second way to reduce the lender’s informational advantage would be to allow correlation between incomes y1 and y2 . In this case, a borrower can learn about her
date 2 income from her date 1 income. Formally, she would update her posterior
beliefs of the probability of high date 2 income, to p̂, say. As long as date 1 income
does not perfectly reveal date 2 income, p̂ ∈ (0, 1). Consequently, our results remain
unchanged qualitatively when we replace p with p̂ in our analysis.
Third, we consider a version of our model in which the lender’s information advantage
is superior knowledge of the borrower’s house value rather than her income. This
asymmetry can also generate predation, even absent any uncertainty about income.
17

For example, consider a distressed borrower who knows her future income prospects
but is not sure whether her house value is H1 or H2 > H1 . The lender, on the other
hand, knows the true house value. Suppose the amount RL0 owed on the loan exceeds
even H2 , and let H̄ be the borrower’s expectation of her house value, so that if the
borrower defaults, she expects to pay H̄ to the lender. Then, provided H2 − X < H̄,
the borrower would agree to refinancing terms in which she pays y1 at date 1 and
P2 = H2 − y1 at date 2. This loan is predatory if H2 − X > H1 .
Fourth, we consider a version of our model in which the incumbent’s private information does not arise costlessly from his ongoing lending relationship with the borrower.
In this case, the lender would be willing to pay for the information. In particular,
suppose that at some date prior to the revelation of date 1 income and the house
value, the lender can pay to acquire information about the borrower’s date 2 income. This would be the order of events if, for example, the information gathering
involves pulling regular credit reports on existing borrowers once the relationship begins. Provided the cost is not too high, the lender would use this costly screening
technology, because lending only to borrowers with good prospects is more profitable
than predatory lending when house values are low.

6

Welfare and policy implications

A number of issues confront policymakers in the consumer credit market. We use our
model to evaluate the welfare consequences at stake. The implications differ substantially from those elsewhere in the lending literature because predatory lending entails
too much lending, not too little. In traditional analyses, frictions (informational or
otherwise) generally depress the supply of credit, which reduces welfare.17 In contrast, in our framework, informational frictions increase the supply of credit, which
reduces welfare. A key challenge for policy is to eliminate welfare-reducing lending in
such a way that welfare-improving lending is affected as little as possible.

Fostering competition
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which rewards a bank for “helping meet
the credit needs of its entire community,” is a leading example of legislative efforts to
17

See, however, papers such as De Meza and Webb [12] in which asymmetric information leads to
socially excessive lending.
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foster competition to lend.18 To the extent that it succeeds, it pushes entrants into
the local lending market. In our model, the entrants are themselves non-predatory,
and benefit borrowers by reducing incumbents’ profits from predatory lending. Thus,
our model predicts that the CRA generally benefits borrowers. When predation is
eliminated, lenders offer refinancing only to borrowers with good prospects; therefore,
an important prediction is that the benefits of laws such as the CRA may take the
form of reduced lending to vulnerable borrowers.
The CRA is less help when both borrower income and collateral are low, such as
in a recession (see Proposition 7). In this situation, refinancing would allow the
incumbent to reduce his expected losses on the existing loan, but is not profitable
enough to attract new lenders. Consequently, attempts to push entrants into the
market are effective only if regulators provide sufficient rewards that lenders will offer
refinancing even at loss-making terms.

Securitization
Securitization is often suspected of fostering predation (see GAO [20]; Engel and McCoy [15],[16]), because originators who expect to sell a loan may care too little about
the borrower’s ability to repay it. Our analysis suggests an opposing effect, whereby
securitization may deter predation. Consider again the case in which income and
collateral are low. The lender’s willingness to lend to both good and bad prospects
in this scenario follows from his continuing exposure to the original mortgage. If, instead, the original lender sold the loan into a securitization, provided he still possessed
the private information, he would offer this refinancing only to the good prospects.
The borrower could look for refinancing from the servicer of the securitization, but
the contracts between servicers and the securitization’s creditors tend to have little
latitude for such restructuring.19 Thus, the outcome can be the socially beneficial
one – refinancing for borrowers who can ultimately afford it, and foreclosure for those
that cannot.
18

See http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/cra/. The U.S. Congress cites the scarcity of
lenders in poor neighborhoods as a prime motive for the CRA of 1977 (see Barr [3], p. 523). For
related analysis of the CRA and predatory lending, see, e.g., Marisco [28].
19
See, e.g, the testimony of Julia Gordon to the House Committee on Financial Services’ Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, April 16, 2008; the remarks of FDIC Chairman
Sheila C. Bair to the Joint Venture Silicon Valley Network State of the Valley Conference, February
22, 2008; Emmet Pierce, “Homeowners find loan aid is limited; Consumer groups claiming inaction,”
San Diego Union-Tribune, June 26, 2008.
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This mechanism by which securitization curtails predatory lending is related to the
standard corporate finance argument that dispersion of creditors makes refinancing
more difficult.20 However, in standard models, this difficulty tends to be costly; in
our model, in which refinancing can be welfare reducing, creditor dispersion can be
beneficial. Securitization and the debt-overhang problem together prevent a badprospects borrower from receiving “phantom help.”

Predatory lending laws
Laws aimed at predatory lending have passed in many states (see, e.g., Bostic et al.
[8]). These laws are generally structured to identify high-cost loans by their rates
and fees and then restrict them in various ways. Because these restrictions depend
entirely on facts observable to borrowers at origination, they are not aimed directly
at the predation we model. They do, however, interact with it in several ways, which
we briefly sketch.
One of the contractual features commonly restricted is the prepayment penalty (e.g.,
Section 30 of Illinois’ High Risk Home Loan Act, Public Act 93-0561). Because a
prepayment penalty raises the cost of refinancing with an entrant, it tends to reduce
competition at the refinancing stage, so as Propositions 7 and 8 indicate, the restriction tends to reduce the incidence and severity of predation. However, limits on
prepayment penalties are unlikely to be a “free lunch” for borrowers, as lenders may
raise the interest rate R on the initial loan to make up for the reduction in refinancing
profits.
Another common restriction is on balloon payments (Bostic et al. [8]), i.e. large terminal payments that effectively require refinancing. We can approximate the balloon
structure in our framework by making the initial mortgage a one-payment mortgage
due at date 1. This change has no effect on borrowers with low income at date 1, because they would need refinancing anyway. However, borrowers with high income at
date 1 are affected, because they now need refinancing to avoid foreclosure. This gives
the lender bargaining power that can lead to predatory refinancing of high-income
borrowers similar to the predation of low-income borrowers established in Proposition
2. Specifically, the lender uses his monopoly position to offer refinancing terms that
the borrower will not be able to repay if her date 2 income is low. These terms make
a borrower with bad prospects worse off because she pays some of her date 1 income
but nonetheless loses her house. Formally, we can state the result as follows:
20
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Proposition 9 Borrowers with low income at date 1 are equally vulnerable to predation under one-period and two-period mortgages. Borrowers with high income at
date 1 are vulnerable to predation under a one-period mortgage in circumstances in
which they are not vulnerable under a two-period mortgage.
Another type of restriction common to predatory-lending laws is a prohibition on loans
made without due regard to repayment ability. For example, the North Carolina
law obliges lenders to “reasonably believe” that the borrower can repay the loan,
considering both current and expected income. Although the inclusion of expected
income directly targets the predation we model, lenders have a wide safe harbor: if
the borrower’s total monthly debts (mortgage included) at origination are not more
that half her verified income, repayment ability is presumed. This presumption may
reflect the practical difficulty of observing, let alone verifying, what a lender really
expects.
The restrictions on high-cost loans are similar in effect to interest-rate caps, in that
they do not ban high interest rates but they do discourage them. Such caps can
either help or hurt borrowers. All else being equal, although lower interest rates
benefit borrowers, our comparative statics (see Table 1) show that lower R on the
original mortgage actually increases the incidence of predation.
Several studies ask whether the realized effect of these restrictions has been positive or
negative. Although the studies (Elliehausen and Staten [13], Litan [26], Quercia et al.
[34], Ho and Pennington-Cross [24]) agree that one effect is reduced subprime originations, they disagree on whether this outcome is beneficial. For example, Elliehausen
and Staten argue that the reduction reflects a withdrawal by potential lenders that
reduces consumer welfare, whereas Quercia et al. suggest that the reduction in restricted loan features — specifically prepayment penalties and balloon payments — is
de facto evidence that predation decreased. Our model gives a different take on these
findings. The reduction in loan volume could be welfare improving because lending
can decrease when predation is suppressed. The reductions in balloon payments and
prepayment penalties are most effective at suppressing predation not at origination
but later, when they reduce the lender’s power over the borrower.

21

New legislation
The recently-signed Housing and Economic Recovery Act21 addresses the high rates of
default and foreclosure by, among other things, allowing borrowers and their lenders
to exit distressed mortgages at a discount. Lenders approved by the Federal Housing
Administration would refinance borrowers out of mortgages they apparently cannot
currently afford into new mortgages that they can currently afford, which have principal amounts at least 10% lower. In the aggregate, this may help serve the act’s stated
goal of avoiding foreclosures through creating new equity for troubled homeowners.
However, it may also worsen the problems our analysis identifies. An incumbent
lender would welcome this exit opportunity even if he knows the borrower has bad
prospects and the new loan will fail to avert eventual foreclosure, i.e. is “phantom
help.”

Wage garnishment
Thus far we assume that lenders are unable to seize a borrower’s income. This form
of borrower protection encourages predation, because a lender who sees foreclosure
as inevitable is encouraged to postpone it by refinancing to collect cash that would
otherwise be off limits. Since lenders do have some ability to access a borrower’s
earnings — albeit limited and depending on the jurisdiction — we consider how
wage garnishment might affect the incidence of predation. We suppose that if the
borrower fails to make her date 1 loan payment, the incumbent can garnish as much
of the borrower’s date 1 and date 2 income as is needed to repay the loan.
When house values are low, lenders have no incentive to refinance if wage garnishment
is possible. If the loan balance not covered by liquidation, i.e. the deficiency, is greater
than total date 1 and date 2 income, the lender is due to get everything — the house
and all income — and there is no more to be gained. However, if the deficiency is
small then the lender of a distressed borrower with bad prospects can improve on
immediate foreclosure by refinancing into a high-interest mortgage that takes more
income than the original deficiency. Such refinancing is predatory because in a futile
effort to keep her house, a borrower with bad prospects ends up paying money she
would otherwise have kept.
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See “Summary of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008,” Section B, at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/ files/HousingandEconomicRecoveryActSummary.pdf.
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Identifying predatory lenders
One of the goals of regulators, as evidenced by enforcement actions, is to identify
predatory lenders. Our model shows how predation can arise, but there remains
the question of how those who partake in it can be distinguished from those who
abstain. Perhaps the cleanest test is on cash-out refinancings. In the model, all cashout refinancings of bad prospects are predatory, but they occur only when the house
value is sufficiently high. With a non-predatory lender, cash-out refinancings of bad
prospects would not occur, regardless of house value. Thus, in cash-out refinancings,
a more predatory lender would show a higher correlation between house value and
subsequent foreclosure.
Another and quite different strategy would be to follow the lead of several recent
empirical studies of payday lending (Morse [31]; Morgan [30]; Skiba and Tobacman
[38]), and try to identify whether an empirically distinguishable segment of subprime
mortgage activity reduces welfare. For example, one could examine whether interstate variation in the anti-predatory lending laws (see, e.g., Ho and Pennington-Cross
[24]) is related to welfare outcomes. Possible welfare outcomes to consider range from
those related specifically to the housing market, such as foreclosure and bankruptcy,
to more general measures, such as health or crime.

7

Conclusion

This paper presents a framework for analyzing the incidence of predatory lending.
The key element of our analysis is the informational advantage lenders gain over their
existing borrowers. We consider the implications of this informational advantage for
the refinancing of mortgages in the subprime market. When borrowers refinance
to relieve financial distress, predatory lenders extract extra cash before inevitable
foreclosure. This form of predation is always possible under monopolistic conditions,
but is eliminated by competition if house values are high enough. When a borrower
refinances to obtain cash for immediate consumption, predatory lending occurs when
house values are high enough; home improvement loans are especially at risk. In
contrast to predatory refinancing of distressed loans, this form of predation leads to
more foreclosures. Again, competition between lenders generally reduces or eliminates
the problem.
The generally beneficial effect of competition in the subprime market supports legis-
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lation that encourages entry such as the CRA. Predatory-lending laws, which weaken
monopoly power by restricting loan features such as prepayment penalties, also appear to be beneficial to borrowers. However, laws that limit interest rates leave at
least some borrowers more exposed to predation, because these laws widen the range
of home values for which predatory cash-out refinancing is possible. Finally, securitization, which is often suspected of contributing to predation, imparts a benefit by
frustrating refinancing of precisely those borrowers who would lose from refinancing.
The model addresses financial distress arising from low income. Financial distress
can also arise from high payments, as can occur with adjustable-rate mortgages.
Such mortgages are especially prevalent in the subprime market, and account for a
disproportionate number of foreclosures.22 Many of our results would extend to an
alternative framework in which the lender’s informational advantage is instead about
the distribution of future interest rates. In this case, a form of predatory lending
would arise in which borrowers take floating-rate loans that the lender anticipates
will result in unaffordable future payments. Because the lender’s information advantage here relates to a macroeconomic variable, a notable implication is that both
predation and ensuing defaults are necessarily temporally clustered. For the same reason, competition is likely to have a greater effect than in our model, since competitors
would be more likely to share the incumbent’s informational advantage.
Finally, accusations of predatory behavior are made in the payday lending market
as well as in the subprime mortgage market. Just as we show that a model based
on borrowers suffering an information disadvantage relative to their lenders can be
used to analyze the mortgage market, it would be interesting to analyze a similar
model of the payday lending market. Certainly, an informational asymmetry would
generate the possibility of predation by payday lenders. Payday loans are particularly
expensive if they are rolled over for many months. Thus, one could analyze this market
with a model in which a borrower rationally takes a payday loan with the expectation
that she will repay the following month, while the lender is able to identify a subset
of borrowers who are, in fact, unlikely to be able to repay so quickly. Loans to this
identifiable subset of borrowers are predatory. Whether such a model is capable of
producing further insights is a question we leave for future research.
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Appendix A: Mathematical proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Fix a date 1 income realization y1 . Absent refinancing,
both borrower types pay the same amount to the incumbent and attain the same
surplus from the expenditure and/or house (e.g., if y1 = K, both borrower types pay
min{RL0 , H}, lose the house, and undertake the expenditure if K ≥ M). Now,
consider any equilibrium in which both borrower types agree to refinancing terms
involving payments of P1 and P2 on dates 1 and 2 respectively, and in which the
borrower does not learn her type at date 1. (Clearly, if the borrower learns her
type, no predation can occur.) Because the borrower does not learn her type, both
borrower types take the same actions at date 1. At date 2, either both borrower
types take the same action or only the high-income borrower makes payment P2 .
The latter case occurs only if the difference between P2 , the scheduled payment, and
min{P2 , H}, the payment made in default, exceeds the surplus from the house, X.
It follows that the payment net of surplus gained is weakly greater for the date 2
high-income borrower than the low-income borrower. Therefore, if the refinancing
makes the good prospects borrower strictly worse off, the same must be true for the
bad prospects borrower. However, under these conditions the borrower would not
accept the refinancing terms, completing the proof. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Because the lender recovers min {H, RL0 } under the
existing loan contract, in any refinancing P1 + P2 ≥ min {H, RL0 }, and because the
borrower has low date 1 income, P1 ≤ K. Assumption 1 implies that P2 > K;
therefore a borrower with bad prospects defaults on the refinancing loan at date 2.
Moreover, P1 + P2 ≤ I + K; otherwise, a borrower with good prospects also defaults
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at date 2, and in this case refinancing has exactly the same foreclosure outcomes as
the existing loan, and so the total equilibrium payments also remain unchanged.
Given these preliminaries, the lender’s profits and the bad-prospects borrower’s welfare loss are both bounded above by the quantities associated with the refinancing
terms P1 = K and P2 = I. Evaluating, the lender’s profits (relative to not refinancing) are bounded above by K + pI + (1 − p) min {H, I} − min {H, RL0 }, and the badprospects borrower’s loss is bounded above by K + min {H, I} − min {H, RL0 } + SK .
The expressions in the proposition statement follow from the observation that H ≤ I
implies H < RL0 because (by Assumption 2) I < RL0 .
It remains to show there is an equilibrium in which the lender offers the refinancing
terms P1 = K and P2 = I regardless of his information, and the uninformed borrower
accepts.23 The borrower accepts this offer, because she avoids foreclosure when her
date 2 income is high, and (by Assumption 3) this gain exceeds the increase in payments and possible loss of the expenditure. Even if the borrower has bad prospects,
the lender recovers more from this refinancing than from immediate foreclosure because (by Assumption 2) K + min {H, I} > min {H, RL0 }. Finally, the lender does
not want to deviate to another refinancing offer since doing so would raise his profits
only if P2 strictly exceeded I; but since this would cause the borrower to default
regardless of her income, she would accept such an offer only if the total payments
are less than min {H, RL0 }. QED
Proof of Proposition 3:
predatory equilibria.

The result uses the following characterization of non-

Proposition 10 Suppose y1 = K and the incumbent is a monopolist. Two types of
non-predatory equilibrium exist:
(i) The lender offers the same refinancing to all borrowers. The borrowers accept
the offer. The lender’s expected profit is zero.
(ii) The lender offers different refinancing terms to each type of borrower. In the
equilibrium most profitable for the lender, his expected profit is max {0, p (I − H)}.
In particular, if H ≥ I, the lender’s expected profit is zero.
23

In an earlier working paper we characterize the full set of predatory equilibria. We also characterize the predatory equilibrium when X is smaller and limits the amount the lender can charge in
refinancing.
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Because our main focus is on predatory equilibria, we relegate the proof of Proposition
10 to Appendix B.
Given Proposition 10, the result is almost immediate. From Proposition 2 the lender’s
highest predatory profit is always strictly positive and so exceeds the highest nonpredatory profit if H ≥ I. If instead H < I, the lender’s highest predatory profit is
K + p (I − H), which exceeds p (I − H), the highest non-predatory profit. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: Necessity of the conditions H ≥ P̄2 and S−(1 − p) X ≥ 0
for predation is proved in the main text. Taking these conditions, the proof establishes sufficiency and characterizes the lender’s highest profits and the worst badprospects borrower’s welfare loss. For use throughout the proof, note that the borrower’s total payments under the existing loan can be written I −M + P̄2 . Refinancing
affects payoffs only if it allows the borrower to afford the expenditure, P1 ≤ I − M.
An uninformed borrower accepts refinancing only if she can afford it when her date
2 income is high, P1 + P2 ≤ 2I − M, and the increase in her total payments is less
than her welfare gain,24

P1 + pP2 + (1 − p) min {H, P2 } − I − M + P̄2 ≤ S − (1 − p) X.
(1)
Consider any refinancing terms that satisfy these three inequalities and also increase
the lender’s total payment, P1 + pP2 + (1 − p) min {H, P2 } ≥ I − M + P̄2 . An
equilibrium exists in which the lender offers these terms regardless of his information;
the borrower accepts; the borrower interprets any other refinancing terms as meaning
she has bad prospects; and the loan is predatory. This follows by construction,
and since given the borrower’s beliefs she rejects any deviating offer that is strictly
profitable for the lender.

The lender’s highest profit and the bad-prospects borrower’s worst loss are achieved
when P1 and P2 are set as high as possible. Hence the lender’s highest profit is
min I − P̄2 , pI + (1 − p) H − P̄2 , S − (1 − p) X . If H is high, H ≥ P̄2 + S −
(1 − p) X, inequality (1) binds at a level of P2 below
H, so that the borrower al
ways repays. In this case, the worst loss is min I − P̄2 , S − (1 − p) X + X − S.
Otherwise,
inequality (1) binds at a level of P2 above H, and the worst loss is

min I − P̄2 , H − P̄2 + X − S. Combining these two cases gives the result. QED
Proof of Proposition 5:
predatory equilibria.

The result uses the following characterization of non-

24

As noted in the main text, any refinancing that allows the borrower to afford the expenditure
causes her to default if her date 2 income is low.
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Proposition 11 Suppose y1 = I and the incumbent is a monopolist. In nonpredatory equilibria, only a borrower with good prospects is refinanced.

 In the equilibrium most profitable for the lender, his expected profit is max 0, p min I − P̄2 , S, I − H
In particular, if H ≥ I, the lender’s expected profit is zero.
Because our main focus is on predatory equilibria, we relegate the proof of Proposition
11 to Appendix B.
Given Proposition 10, the result is almost immediate. From Proposition 4, the
lender’s highest predatory profit is always strictly positive, and so exceeds the highest
non-predatory
profit if H ≥ I. If instead H < I, the lender’s highest predatory profit

is min pI + (1 − p) H − P̄2 , S − (1 − p) X ; and the lender’s highest non-predatory
profit is p min {S, I − H} (because I − P̄2 ≥ I − H > 0). The former expression is
increasing in H ∈ [P̄2 , I), whereas the latter is decreasing over the same range and
equals 0 at H = I. So when H is large enough the highest predatory profit strictly
exceeds the highest non-predatory profit. QED
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 4. The
sufficiency of the conditions and the necessity of S ≥ (1 − p) X follow exactly as
before. For the necessity of H ≥ P̄2 − M, suppose, to the contrary, that a predatory
lending equilibrium exists when H < P̄2 − M = R (RL0 − I). The lender will offer
new financing terms only with P2 ≥ P̄2 > M + H. At date 2, the lender will recover
only M + H from the borrower if she has bad prospects. Thus, under refinancing,
the total net payment in dates 1 and 2 from the borrower with bad prospects to the
lender is weakly less than (I − M) +(M + H). Given H < R (RL0 − I), this amount
is strictly less than I + R (RL0 − I), which the lender can obtain from the borrower
by not offering refinancing. QED
Proof of Proposition 7: As a preliminary, define P2K as the date 2 payment a
borrower must promise
at date 2, i.e.
 K for a lender to recover RL0 − K in expectation
K
K
pP2 + (1 − p) min P2 , H = RL0 − K. If H ≥ RL0 − K, then P2 = RL0 − K, and
otherwise P2K = p1 (RL0 − K − (1 − p) H). Note that P2K ≥ I implies H < RL0 − K,
because otherwise P2K = RL0 − K ≥ I, violating Assumption 2.
Part (A): Competition has no effect if P2K > I, because in this case an uninformed
entrant cannot recover RL0 . By above, P2K > I implies P2K = p1 (RL0 − K − (1 − p) H).
Rearranging terms gives the result.
1
Part (B): If H ≥ 1−p
(RL0 − K − pI) then P2K ≤ I and an equilibrium exists in
which both the incumbent and entrant lenders offer to refinance the borrower at terms
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K, P2K , and the borrower accepts. The borrower accepts because under the status
quo, she defaults, loses her house, pays min {H, RL0 } to the incumbent, and gets
surplus S from the expenditure if M ≤ K. If she accepts the refinancing, she keeps
her house with probability p (because P2K ≤ I), does not undertake the expenditure,
and pays RL0 in expectation to her lender. Therefore, she certainly accepts due to
Assumption 3. The lenders will make such an offer because it nets zero profits for the
entrants and weakly increases the incumbent’s recovery from min {H, RL0 } to RL0 .
This is the worst equilibrium outcome for a bad-prospects borrower. To see this, note
first that a separating equilibrium cannot result in a loss for any type of borrower,
because in such an equilibrium a borrower learns her type. So the only candidate
for an equilibrium with a larger welfare loss entails both borrower types accepting a
refinancing with P1 + P2 > K + P2K . But then one the entrants can profitably deviate
by offering (P1 , P2 − ε) (where ε is arbitrarily small) and capturing the entire market.
By the same argument, no equilibrium exists in which the incumbent’s profits are
increased by more than RL0 − min {H, RL0 }.
The welfare calculation follows from straightforward algebra.
Part (C): Follows from a direct comparison of the bad-prospects welfare loss calculated above, and in Proposition 2. QED
Proof of Proposition 8: Predation can occur only as part of an equilibrium in which
the incumbent makes the same offer to borrowers with good and bad prospects, and
moreover, the offer allows the borrower to afford the expenditure. The necessity of the
conditions H ≥ RL0 −I +M and S −(1 − p) X ≥ 0 follows as in the monopolistic case
(Proposition 4). From these two conditions, it is straightforward to see that in any
predatory equilibrium the borrower’s total expected payment to the incumbent across
dates 1 and 2 is RL0 , because otherwise either an entrant could undercut him, or the
incumbent would not lend. Absent refinancing, a borrower pays I + R (RL0 − I) to
the incumbent and keeps her house. Under predatory refinancing, a bad-prospects
borrower pays, at most, a total of RL0 to the incumbent across dates 1 and 2, gains
the expenditure surplus, S, but loses her house. Hence, the bad-prospects borrower’s
worst loss in any equilibrium is X − S − (R − 1) (RL0 − I), and a necessary condition
for predation is that this term is strictly positive.
For sufficiency, suppose that the three conditions identified above hold. We claim
the following is an equilibrium: all entrants offer to supply RL0 + M − I at date 1
in return for a promise to pay P2I = RL0 − I + M at date 2, while the incumbent
offers to accept a payment I − M at date 1 in return for a promise to pay P2I at
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date 2. The borrower accepts the incumbent’s offer. We do not impose any specific
off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs.
The borrower is indifferent between the entrant and incumbent offers. If the borrower
rejects all offers, she pays a total of I + R (RL0 − I) to her existing lender. If instead
she accepts the incumbent’s offer, her total net payment at dates 1 and 2 is RL0 .
Although she enjoys new consumption with a surplus of S, she loses the surplus
X from her house with a probability of (1 − p). She accepts the incumbent’s offer
because S ≥ (1 − p) X and additionally her total payments fall by (R − 1) (RL0 − I).
The bad-prospects borrower’s surplus loss equals the upper bound identified above,
namely, X − S − (R − 1) (RL0 − I).
Under the equilibrium refinancing terms, the incumbent recovers exactly the outstanding loan balance, RL0 . So the incumbent is willing to lend at these terms,
entrants cannot profit by undercutting the incumbent, and competition from the
entrants rules out any strictly profitable deviation for the incumbent.
Whenever predation is possible under monopoly, its severity is reduced by competition, since competition either eliminates it or reduces the bad-prospects borrower’s
loss.25
Finally, under the conditions of Proposition 8, the incumbent recovers RL0 in any
equilibrium. We already show this for predatory equilibria. For non-predatory
equilibria either the incumbent does not lend, entrants refinance the borrower, and
incumbent receives RL0 ; or the incumbent only lends to good-prospects borrowers and
competition again drives the amount the incumbent recovers down to RL0 . QED
Proof of Proposition 9: Under both the one-period and two-period mortgage
contracts, the status quo for a borrower with low date 1 income is foreclosure and a
payment of min {RL0 , H} to the lender.
Next, consider the case in which the borrower’s date 1 income is high. We claim that
a predatory lending equilibrium exists under the one-period mortgage whenever
I + K < min {H, RL0 } + pX − S1I≥M .

(2)

Because this condition can hold when the conditions of Proposition 4 fail, the result
follows.
25

Note that the bad-prospects borrower’s worst loss in the monopoly case is at least X −S +I − P̄2 ,
which exceeds X − S − (R − 1) (RL0 − I), because 2I > RL0 + M (from Assumption 2).
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To establish the claim, choose P2 > K such that
p (I + P2 )+(1 − p) (I + min {H, P2 }) ∈ (min {H, RL0 } , min {H, RL0 } + pX − S1I≥M ]
(Such a choice is possible because at P2 = K + ε, where ε is small, the lefthand
side term equals I + K + ε by Assumption 1.) An equilibrium exists in which the
lender refinances the borrower in exchange for a payment I at date 1 and a promise
to pay P2 at date 2. The uninformed borrower accepts because, by construction, the
increase in her payment is less than the gain of avoiding foreclosure when her date 2
income is high. The lender agrees to refinance at these terms as it increases his total
recovery. QED

Appendix B: Proof of Propositions 10 and 11
We classify any equilibrium in which borrowers either take no loan or take a loan that
leaves both types’ expected payoff and foreclosure outcomes unchanged, as degenerate. Propositions 10 and 11 relate to non-degenerate and non-predatory equilibria:
Proof of Proposition 10: Under the original loan contract, both types of borrower
default at date 1 and the lender receives min {H, RL0 }. Because by Assumption 1,
2K < min {H, RL0 }, no non-predatory equilibrium exists in which the bad-prospects
borrower obtains refinancing that allows her to avoid foreclosure. As such, in any
non-predatory equilibrium, the bad-prospects borrower’s welfare is the same as under
the original loan contract, and she loses her house in foreclosure.
We now prove part (i). The lender offers refinancing to a borrower only if P1 + P2 ≥
min {H, RL0 } . From above, refinancing lowers the welfare of a borrower with bad
prospects unless P1 + P2 ≤ min {H, RL0 }. So the only possible non-predatory equilibrium in which both borrower types receive financing has P1 + P2 = min {H, RL0 }.
Such an equilibrium exists because both borrower types are weakly better off accepting refinancing under these terms, and the lender makes zero profits (relative to
immediate foreclosure). (To prevent the lender from deviating to other offers, borrowers’ beliefs are such that if a higher total payment is offered, then the borrower
believes that she has bad prospects and therefore rejects the offer.)
To prove part (ii), recall that in a non-predatory equilibrium the bad borrower’s welfare does not change due to refinancing. Therefore, in such equilibrium both parties
must be indifferent due to refinancing the borrower with bad prospects. Consequently,
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any profit must be made by lending to the borrower with good prospects. We deal
with the case H ≥ I and H < I separately.
Case: H ≥ I. We claim that no non-predatory equilibrium exists with strictly
positive profits for the lender. To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that there exist
P1 and P2 such that the lender offers these terms to a good-prospects borrower, who
accepts and repays, and P1 + P2 > min {H, RL0 }. Let A ≥ 0 be the equilibrium
savings of the good-prospects borrower; note that repayment at date 2 demands
I + A ≥ P2 . If the lender offers the same loan to the bad-prospects borrower, he
gets P1 + min {P2 , H + A}. Because H + A ≥ H + P2 − I ≥ P2 , the lender recovers
P1 + P2 > min {H, RL0 } from the bad-prospects borrower, implying that he has a
strictly profitable deviation.
For H ≥ I, a non-predatory equilibrium exists with the following features: the lender
offers to refinance the good-prospects borrower to P1 = K, P2 = min {H, RL0 } − K,
and the borrower accepts. By Assumption 2, I + K > RL0 ≥ min {H, RL0 }, and
so a good-prospects borrower can afford to pay P2 at date 2. Because P2 < H, the
good-prospects borrower would be worse off if she strategically defaulted at date 2.
As such, if she accepts the offer, she will repay. Because the lender’s payoff is the
same, and social surplus is increased (foreclosure is avoided), it follows that the goodprospects borrower is strictly better off accepting the offer. Moreover, the lender
clearly gains nothing from offering this loan to the bad-prospects borrower.


Finally, consider any other offer P̃1 , P̃2 . The lender has no incentive to deviate
to an offer with P̃1 + P̃2 ≤ min {H, RL0 }. Consider any offer with P̃1 + P̃2 >
min {H, RL0 } and suppose that the borrower interprets such an offer as indicating
that she has bad prospects. As
n such,o if she accepts the loan, she will not save and she
anticipates paying P̃1 + min H, P̃2 to the lender. If this amount is strictly more
than min {H, RL0 } it is a best response to reject. On the other hand, if this amount is
weakly less than min {H, RL0 }, then certainly P̃2 > H ≥ I. But then if the borrower
accepts and does not save, shen defaults
o at date 2 even if her prospects are good, and
the lender recovers P̃1 + min H, P̃2 , which is weakly less than min {RL0 , H}. So
the lender has no profitable deviation.
Case: H < I. We first show that in equilibrium the lender cannot recover more
than I from a good-prospects borrower. Suppose, to the contrary, that such an
equilibrium exists. It must entail acceptance of a contract (P1 , P2 ) with P1 + P2 > I,
which in turn requires either P1 > 0 or equilibrium savings A > 0. But then the
lender would recover strictly more than H from offering this contract to a borrower
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with bad prospects, implying he has a profitable deviation.
Finally, we show that there is an equilibrium in which the lender attains this upper
bound and recovers I from a good-prospects borrower: specifically, the lender offers
P1 = 0 and P2 = I to the borrower with good prospects and does not offer refinancing
to the borrower with bad prospects. The borrower accepts this offer because it lets her
avoid foreclosure, and by Assumption 3, this gain exceeds the increase in payments
and possible loss of the expenditure. The borrower does not save. The offer is
profitable for the lender because he recovers min {H, RL0 } = H (because I < RL0 by
Assumption 2) absent refinancing. Moreover, the lender would not gain by offering
these terms to a borrower with bad prospects.

It remains to check that the lender has
no other strictly profitable deviation P̃1 , P̃2 . The deviation is strictly profitable
only if P̃1 + P̃2 > H. Let the borrower interpret any such a deviation as meaning
she has bad prospects. So if P̃1 > 0, she rejects this offer. If instead P̃1 ≤ 0, she
accepts the offer and does not save, and the lender’s total recovery is bounded above
by max {H, I} = I. QED

Proof of Proposition 11:
By Assumption 2, the borrower with bad prospects
cannot afford both the house and the expenditure. Consequently, by Assumption 3,
total welfare falls whenever she refinances to incur the expenditure. This implies that
in a non-predatory equilibrium, the lender does not extend credit to her because it is
not profitable.
The H ≥ I case is just the same as the low-income monopoly case, by parallel
arguments. Under the status quo, the incumbent gets I + R (RL0 − I). If an offer
has P1 + P2 greater than this, the incumbent would get P1 + min {H + A, P2 } from
giving these terms to the bad-prospects borrower. As before, we need A ≥ P2 − I.
Because H − I > 0, the incumbent has a strictly profitable deviation. The nonpredatory equilibrium in this case is: P1 = I − M and P2 = P̄2 = M + R (RL0 − I).
Next, consider the case H < I. In any non-predatory equilibrium with strictly
positive profits, the payments P1 and P2 must satisfy P1 + P2 ≤ 2I − M (otherwise
the borrower cannot afford both the payments and the expenditure) and P1 + P2 ≤
I + R (RL0 − I) + S (otherwise, the borrower prefers the status quo). In addition,
if P1 + P2 > 2I − H + R (RL0 − I), the lender would recover strictly more than
I + R (RL0 − I) from giving the loan to the bad-prospects borrower, because P1 +
H + A ≥ P1 + H + P2 − I. So the lender’s maximal recovery from the good-prospects
borrower is
I + R (RL0 − I) + min {I − M − R (RL0 − I) , S, I − H} .
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(3)

We claim that this upper bound is obtained in the following equilibrium: P1 =
R (RL0 − I) + min {I − M − R (RL0 − I) , S, I − H}, and P2 = I, along with no
saving by the good-prospects borrower. By construction, a good-prospects borrower
would accept and repay this loan. Because P2 > H, the lender would recover
P1 + H ≤ I + R (RL0 − I) by offering this loan to a bad-prospects borrower.
It
 remains
 to check that the lender does not have a strictly profitable deviation
P̃1 , P̃2 . Let the borrower interpret any deviation as indicating he has bad prospects.

A necessary condition for the deviation to be strictly profitable is that P̃1 + P̃2 >
I +R (RL0 − I). Given the stated beliefs, the borrower rejects any such offer because
it leads either to the loss of her house or to an increase in her total repayment (but
without the benefit of the expenditure). QED
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